Big data examination, AI and quantum registering have released their abilities past profiting India Inc. alone. These momentous stylish advancements are good to go to cast a noteworthy tempest in the Indian Polity as well. Ideal from picking up the…
Although no data is available, it’s fair to say a big majority of economic experts got the election wrong. Some of them got it spectacularly wrong. When you go wrong, and especially if you are an expert, you should try to learn some useful stuff from your errors of judgement/analyses.
Therefore, here’s my decidedly modest contribution to that process of learning. My non-expert, journalistic submission is that experts got elections wrong because they ignored ‘me’croeconomics.
Experts do rigorous analysis of macroeconomics and microeconomics. ‘Me’croeconomics is field study of the immediate economic environment of people. Economics as it affects ‘me’.
Pundits were right that economic slowdown and stalled private investment at a macro level and consumption slowdown at a micro level coincided with Narendra Modi’s reelection campaign. But some of these economic numbers reflect the ‘me’croeconomics of India’s top 15% people by income and purchasing power.
What experts didn’t quite see — or they saw and didn’t appreciate enough — was that ‘me’croeconomics of millions of ordinary voters across many states had been altered by one or some or all of Modi’s many welfare schemes. In some cases, the alteration was real — funds for building a house — and, in many cases, there was firm hope that change is coming. The latter, because the message of Modi as a deliverer was firmly anchored.
The Indian Express reported on Friday that Modi’s welfare schemes “resonated” in 115 poor districts that returned 60% of NDA seats in these elections ( bit.do/eTfEv). That’s ‘me’croeconomics in electoral action.
The big pre-election discussion among experts on jobs — in which the political economic ..
In Singh’s second term, the pace of job creation picked up considerably. Indeed, UPA-2’s job creation record was better than every government’s since 1980. But Singh’s second government suffered a humiliating defeat.
In Singh’s second term, the pace of job creation picked up considerably. Indeed, UPA-2’s job creation record was better than every government’s since 1980. But Singh’s second government suffered a humiliating defeat.
So, even assuming job creation was really slow under Modi’s first term, this data should have been a warning for experts when they pegged down his reelection prospects.
There’s another piece of conventional economic data that should have also been a warning to expe ..
‘Me’croeconomy helps understand this better. Just short of 50% of India’s workforce is self-employed. The vast majority of them are at the lower end of the socioeconomic pyramid — farmers and those in related activities, shopkeepers, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, small vendors, etc. Many switch between self-employment and occasional employment.
When Modi mentioned pakoda-sellers and was critiqued by pundits for wishing away the problem of job creation, the latter were right to the ..
Although no data is available, it’s fair to say a big majority of economic experts got the election wrong. Some of them got it spectacularly wrong. When you go wrong, and especially if you are an expert, you should try to learn some useful stuff from your errors of judgement/analyses.
Therefore, here’s my decidedly modest contribution to that process of learning. My non-expert, journalistic submission is that experts got elections wrong because they ignored ‘me’croeconomics.
Experts do rigorous analysis of macroeconomics and microeconomics. ‘Me’croeconomics is field study of the immediate economic environment of people. Economics as it affects ‘me’.
Pundits were right that economic slowdown and stalled private investment at a macro level and consumption slowdown at a micro level coincided with Narendra Modi’s reelection campaign. But some of these economic numbers reflect the ‘me’croeconomics of India’s top 15% people by income and purchasing power.
What experts didn’t quite see — or they saw and didn’t appreciate enough — was that ‘me’croeconomics of millions of ordinary voters across many states had been altered by one or some or all of Modi’s many welfare schemes. In some cases, the alteration was real — funds for building a house — and, in many cases, there was firm hope that change is coming. The latter, because the message of Modi as a deliverer was firmly anchored.
The Indian Express reported on Friday that Modi’s welfare schemes “resonated” in 115 poor districts that returned 60% of NDA seats in these elections ( bit.do/eTfEv). That’s ‘me’croeconomics in electoral action.
The big pre-election discussion among experts on jobs — in which the political economic ..
In Singh’s second term, the pace of job creation picked up considerably. Indeed, UPA-2’s job creation record was better than every government’s since 1980. But Singh’s second government suffered a humiliating defeat.
In Singh’s second term, the pace of job creation picked up considerably. Indeed, UPA-2’s job creation record was better than every government’s since 1980. But Singh’s second government suffered a humiliating defeat.
So, even assuming job creation was really slow under Modi’s first term, this data should have been a warning for experts when they pegged down his reelection prospects.
There’s another piece of conventional economic data that should have also been a warning to expe ..
‘Me’croeconomy helps understand this better. Just short of 50% of India’s workforce is self-employed. The vast majority of them are at the lower end of the socioeconomic pyramid — farmers and those in related activities, shopkeepers, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, small vendors, etc. Many switch between self-employment and occasional employment.
When Modi mentioned pakoda-sellers and was critiqued by pundits for wishing away the problem of job creation, the latter were right to the ..